IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1966.

No. 946.

JOHN WOODY and 192 ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

STERLING ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, INC., and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS

and

DISTRICT NO. 9, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS.

and

LOCAL LODGE NO. 41 OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS and

LARRY CONNORS, DIRECTING BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT NO. 9, I. A. OF M.,

> RUSSELL DAVIS. BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE. DISTRICT NO. 9, 1. A. OF M., Defendants-Appellees.

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

The petitioners herein pray this Court to grant a rehearing of its order of March 13th, 1967, denying a writ

of certiorari, 87 S. Ct. 1026 (1967). Petitioners further pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit as prayed in their petition for certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING AND ISSUING THE WRIT.

Circumstances of substantial and controlling effect have arisen during the time that the petition for writ of certiorari herein was pending. The decision and majority opinion of this Court entered on February 27th, 1967, in the case of Vaca v. Sipes, 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967), thoroughly, favorably and affirmatively answers every question presented for determination by these petitioners. The ruling of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case is now in direct conflict with this Court's opinion in Vaca v. Sipes (supra).

This case was cited "CF", in the Vaca v. Sipes opinion by Justice Fortas "concurring in the result" with the majority opinion (87 S. Ct. at 921). Petitioners urge the grant of rehearing in order to bring a determination of the issues raised herein into conformity with this Court's mandate in Vaca v. Sipes and thereby restore uniformity to the federal common law of labor relations.

¹ Petitioners have previously suggested simultaneous consideration of this case along with its companion case of Brown, et al., v. Sterling, etc., cert. den. 87 S. Ct. 1023. The Brown case was also cited "CF." in the opinion by Justice Fortas in Vaca v. Sipes, 87 S. Ct. at 922, footnote No. 3. However, the Brown citation in Vaca v. Sipes has consistently erroneously designated the Brown certiorari petition as "No. 946, O. T. 1966". The correct Brown certiorari designation is No. 937, O. T. 1966. A petition for rehearing in the Brown case is being filed simultaneously with this petition.

CONCLUSION.

For the reasons set forth herein and in the petition for writ of certiorari it is respectfully urged that rehearing be granted and that, upon such re-hearing, a writ of certiorari issue to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

JEROME J. DUFF, Counsel for Petitioners.

Certificate of Counsel.


I hereby certify that the foregoing petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay and is restricted to grounds specified in Rule 58 of the rules of this Court.

Jerome J. Duff, Counsel for Petitioners.

Certificate of Service.

State of Missouri, Ss. City of St. Louis.

I, Jerome J. Duff, of counsel for the Petitioners herein and attorney of record for the Petitioners in the Court below, depose that on the 6th day of April, 1967, I served four copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing on the Respondents as required by Rule 33, Paragraph 1, by personally mailing said copies hereof to Mr. William Stix, Attorney of Record for Respondent Company, 408



Pine Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101, and Messrs. Bartley, Siegel and Bartley, Attorneys for Respondent Unions 130 South Bemiston Avenue, Clayton, Missouri 63105.
Jerome J. Duff.
Subscribed and sworn to before me at St. Louis, Missouri, on this 6th day of April, 1967.
Notary Public.
My Commission Expires:



"The joint union-employer committee reviewed the records it had as to the longshore work history of the applicants on the basis of the standards set forth in the 1963 Rules. On April 24, 1963, sixteen applicants were found to have failed to satisfy the standards, and they were removed from the Class B list and deregistered. On June 17, 1963, an additional 81 men were found to have failed to satisfy the standards, and they were also deregistered. Of the Class B men who applied for fully registered (Class A) status in 1963, 467 were found to have met the standards and they were given Class A status (R. 757)."

(PMA Brief, p. 12)

of appellants' applications to advance to Class A status, each man was given notice and informed that he had an opportunity to appear before the Joint Port Committee. Each appellant appearing was told of the matters in issue and was permitted to respond (R. 757-758). He was also told he could have a further hearing before a sub-committee of the Joint Port Committee to review the detailed facts on which the committee had acted in refusing his application (R. 757-758). In a few cases (none involving appellants) such hearings before the sub-committee brought to light errors in the facts in the particular cases and established that the men in question had indeed met the committee's standards; they were thereupon granted Class A status (R. 89-90).

'In July 1963, when the respective decisions of the port committee to deregister each of the appellants became final, each man was informed of his right to file a grievance if he wished to attack the decision on the ground that there had been discrimination against him (R. 2). Each of the appellants herein filed a type-written grievance on July 27, 1963. . . "

(PMA Brief, pp. 13-14)



"... appellees were called upon

during the ensuing period to defend unfair labor practice charges brought by five Class B men who were deregistered at the same time as appellants. During the same period, hearings were conducted on a large number of unemployment insurance claims filed by appellants herein and by others. Such hearings were held on November 6, 1963, and in 1964 on January 13, 15, 17, 20, February 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, March 2, 6, 30, 31, and April 1 (R. 198). The breaks in the hearing were principally due to collateral proceedings instituted by appellants' attorney (R. 759). The decision on the claims was not rendered until May 14, 1964 (R. 212).

"The principal issue at the unemployment insurance hearings was not that of whether the man had or had not violated the standards for Class A registration but, rather, whether those violations, if any, would disqualify him for unemployment insurance under the peculiar tests set forth in the statute. The unemployment insurance issue could not be determined without a full investigation of the factual basis for the denial of full registration under the "1963 Rules". These factual questions were vigorously litigated by appellants' attorney and a full record resulted.

"The transcript of the hearings became available to the Joint Port Committee in May, 1964 (R. 475); it was incorporated into the record of the committee when grievance hearings were commenced by that committee later that month (R. 90). The committee also ordered that this record be summarized in writing and made available to each of the appellants for assistance in preparing and presenting his case in the grievance-arbitration proceedings, (R. 91v)."

^{114.} The charges to which we refer were filed by the men on July 25, August 5, September 26, and December 2, 1963. After a field investigation, a complaint was issued by the San Francisco Regional Director on April 2, 1964 (R. 232).

⁽PMA Brief, pp. 14-15)




'Further hearings on the grievances were held in October, 1964, after notice, and all appellants were given full opportunity to present evidence to support, contradict, supplement and explain the summarized evidence and to argue the issues. The Joint Port Committee thereafter determined that each of the appellants had failed to meet the standards for Class A registration. Appellants were given a copy of the decision and were advised of their rights to appeal (R. 91a-91c).

"Appellants' attorney addressed communications to the Joint Coast Committee. These were deemed to be an appeal from the ruling of the Joint Port Committee (R. 86). Counsel for appellants was informed that all men were invited to present their cases to the Joint Coast Committee at the designated time and place (R. 87, 91m). One man, Mr. Love, appeared at the Joint Coast Committee hearing. He was offered, but refused, the assistance of union counsel. He admitted that he failed to meet the standards to remain registered and limited his argument to an attack on the standards (R. 90-91).

The Joint Coast Committee, in its decision issued December 18, 1964, found that the registration standards comprising the "1963 Rules" had been applied fairly and uniformly and without discrimination and that each appellant failed to meet those standards (R. 86-91). Appellants' attorney was served with the decision the day it was rendered (R. 83). The Joint Coast Committee simultaneously gave notice (R. 84-85) to each grievor of his rights under Section 17.4 of the ILWU-PMA agreement (R. 4, page 69) permitting an appeal to the Coast Arbitrator and a review, by him, of the facts of the deregistration. The decision and order of the Joint Coast Committee (R. 86 et seq.) are reproduced as Appendix B to this brief.

"It is uncontroverted that none of appellants or their attorney filed an appeal with the Coast Arbitrator (R. 83). "
(PMA Brief, pp. 15-16)



"From the time appellants were given the opportunity to respond to the summary in September, 1964, to the time of the Joint Coast Committee's decision on December 18, 1964, only three months were involved. In view of these facts, the claim of "delay" cannot now be used as an excuse for the failure to appeal the decision of the Joint Coast Committee to the arbitrator. No case to the contrary is cited."

(PMA Brief, p. 73)

